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ABSTRACT
This article reviews debates about the application of Amartya Sen’s capabili-
ties theory to the understanding and regulation of media and communications. 
It argues that Sen’s insistence on the complexity of ethical reasoning, and the 
underlying complexity of “the good,” makes the capabilities approach the most 
suitable general approach for considering what media justice is. In particular, 
the advantages of Sen’s approach compared with Martha Nussbaum’s specifi-
cation of particular human capabilities are discussed. Possible supplements of 
capabilities thinking by the concept of recognition are also discussed, and their 
limits noted.
Keywords: capabilities, communications, ethics, recognition, complexity 
Capabilities is a topic long overdue for broader attention by researchers in 
media communications and cultural studies: there have been only a few 
exceptions to this neglect. But the wider communications field can no lon-
ger afford to ignore what for some decades has been a major area of debate 
in economics and philosophy, and a concept influential in development 
studies and education. The only excuse for mainstream failure to engage 
with this topic is its difficulty! I hope here to add something useful to this 
debate.
For reasons that will become clear, I am going to anchor my com-
ments in the approach to capabilities of Amartya Sen, not that of Martha 
Nussbaum. When we ask why it is that the capabilities approach is so 
helpful to research in media and communications, it is essential to take 
a position on the various options for pursuing that approach that are 
capabilities for what? 
Nick Couldry 
Nick Couldry: London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Media and 
Communications; British Library of Political and Economic Science
Developing Sen’s Moral Theory For Communications Research
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available. It is Sen’s approach that, I believe, has the greater promise, 
but justifying this requires thinking in some detail about the sorts of 
theoretical move Sen was trying to make when nearly 40 years ago (in a 
speech on “Equality of what?” in May 1979 at Stanford)1 he first intro-
duced the term “capability” into moral philosophy and debates about 
justice.
Sen’s basic goal was to pull economics back to its fundamental terrain 
of ethics. In his 1987 book On Ethics and Economics, Sen insists on a view 
of “social achievement” that “cannot stop short at some arbitrary point 
like satisfying ‘efficiency’.” Instead, that assessment “has to be more fully 
ethical [which means] take a broader view of the good.”2 Although in that 
passage he does not make a specific link to capabilities theory, which, 
in sum, is the route Sen’s work offers to enrich our thinking about “the 
good.” Sen wanted to develop an account of the good, which is more 
attuned to the actual complexity of the world and the actual complex-
ity of how human actors think about value. Both, Sen argues, are much 
broader than how economists have come to think about the world and 
specifically think about the values that orient economic and social prac-
tice. The term “capabilities” is twinned for Sen with another term “func-
tionings”: that is, states of a human life that are potentially valued, and 
capabilities being the possibilities that individuals have of achieving such 
valued states.
Capabilities theory then is a theory of the good that lies within reach of 
human beings, but one that is closely tied to advancing our thinking about 
not only the good, but also, in some sense, justice or at least injustice. But 
Sen’s full position on the concept of justice only emerged much later. 
One thing that follows from all this is that, because capabilities theory is 
a theory of the good, it is irrelevant to criticize Sen for not doing what he 
never aims to do, for example, for failing to provide a sociological theory 
of how people come to have “capabilities.”3 In what follows, I will explain 
the philosophical underpinnings for potential policy developments of the 
capabilities approach: as a media and social theorist, I must leave explora-
tion of the direct policy implications to those with more policy expertise, 
but I hope that, in spite of its abstractness, what follows will prove a useful 
starting point for further debate in the information policy field.
 1. Sen, “Equality of What?”
 2. Sen, On Ethics and Economics, 4.
 3. Zimmermann.
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Paths not Taken
It is important to remember at the start that Sen’s approach was an emphatic 
rejection of two other approaches in moral thinking, which were highly 
dominant at the time he was making this move.4 First was utilitarianism 
(so dominant for decades as a philosophical background to economics), 
but also, just as important, John Rawls’ theory of justice, including Rawls’ 
idea that there is a set of primary goods, which are “necessary means” to 
achieving whatever ends human beings have.5 Sen opposed both these 
approaches for a fundamental reason, which was his belief in adapting 
moral theory to the reality of human diversity.
The distinctiveness of Sen’s approach is clear from his key essay in The 
Quality of Life. There he already defines functionings as “the various things 
he or she manages to do or be in leading a life.”6 This already brings in two 
types of complexity of scope and scale: both doing and being (expanding 
the scope of good as a concept), and the duration of a whole life, a scale 
across which we really can expect a diversity of goods to become more or 
less valued. But Sen goes further and insists, against utilitarianism, on a 
more fundamental heterogeneity: he insists that one valuable functioning 
is freedom, including the freedom precisely to choose between goods or 
functionings. From this it follows that the quality of one’s life cannot sim-
ply be assessed by reference to what state one has actually achieved; its eval-
uation must be related also to what one has chosen to achieve, or not to 
achieve. But such choices are inherently diverse. This is why, in Sen’s view, 
Rawls’ approach to primary goods ignores, as he puts it, the complexities 
that flow from “the fundamental diversity of human beings.”7
But already Sen was clear that the fundamental plurality of goods and 
the necessary lack of full convergence in how people freely choose among 
the functionings available to them means something wider too: that what 
is just cannot, even in principle, be exhaustively resolved by supposedly 
just processes of rational deliberation oriented to reaching a single defini-
tive distribution of a defined set of primary goods. Sen defends an openly 
inductive approach to finding out what sorts of things, and what sorts 
of arrangements of things, comprise the functionings that actual human 
 4. Srinivasan, 458–59.
 5. Rawls, 93.
 6. Sen, “Equality of What?,” 31.
 7. Sen, Inequality Reexamined, 8.
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beings are likely to value and from which they will choose their priorities. 
As he argues,8 we can opt for the capabilities approach without needing 
to resolve all the questions of relative weightings between goods, because 
they can never be fully resolved; they involve an irreducible plurality. Sen 
therefore, from the beginning, opposes the very idea of a complete theory 
of justice. And underlying this, of course, is Sen’s inclination toward some-
thing like an Aristotelian view of ethics that starts out from what values are 
found in the world, and does not believe, as the Kantian tradition does, in 
the possibility of building up those values foundationally from a compre-
hensive rational argument.
And this incidentally for me is the major problem, as some contributors 
to the capabilities debate in communications propose, by using Rainer 
Forst’s recent revival of Kantian procedural rationalism as a way of refining 
or improving Sen. There is a lot more to say about that point of course, but 
my point is more about the Kantian tradition than about Forst in  particular. 
The more, I suggest, is not well suited to acknowledge the  usefulness of the 
theory of the good that Sen offers. Indeed, in his foundational book The 
Right to Justification, Forst barely cites Sen (although, to be fair, Sen’s The 
Idea of Justice was published after Forst’s German edition) and his focus on 
justice is via Rawls.9 The Rawlsian approach (and Forst’s too) risks not only 
circularity (in attempting to fuse principles of just process with specifying 
the states of affairs that would count as achieved social justice). Worse, it 
risks the overblown and misleading claim that it is even possible to resolve 
pluralities in the domain of value, pluralities that I suspect are irreducible. 
I have a lot of sympathy for Raymond Geuss’s harsh dismissal of Rawls in 
his book Outside Ethics as a conservative and indeed a “parochial figure 
who . . . pointed political philosophy in the wrong direction.”10 But that is 
a controversy I do not need to go into further here.
It is not however that Sen doesn’t care about issues of just process. As 
he argues in Development as Freedom “the achievement of social justice” 
involves practice that ensures people have the freedoms and capabilities to 
be heard in the processes, which weigh people’s needs against each other. 
(James Bohman made a similar point in his 1997 essay that picked up the 
importance of Sen’s capabilities approach for thinking about democracy.)11
 8. Sen, “Equality of What?,” 47.
 9. Forst.
 10. Geuss, 39.
 11. Sen, Development as Freedom, 148. Compare Bohman.
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What is most important however about Sen’s approach is something 
which has underlain the discussion so far: his insistence on analytic 
complexity.
Let’s consider a little more the fundamental analytical moves that Sen 
made in developing the capabilities approach. Giles Moss offers a very 
helpful account here.12 To summarize, Sen argues (1) that preferences are 
not naturally occurring consequences of the goods that are objectively 
there to choose, but are themselves socially formed. Sen argues (2) that, 
because people start out from different bodily and other resources, they 
will, in any case, have different needs and so, as it were, “naturally differ-
ent” preferences. And Sen argues (3) that, even if people have all chosen 
those same things, they may need different resources to actually achieve 
those things (so the effect of their preferences is not the same). All this 
on top of the question of choice: the basic fact (4) that, even with the 
same objective needs and resources, different human beings may sim-
ply choose different options from the range of functionings available to 
them. There is something immediately attractive for a field as suspicious 
of false universalism as communications in Sen’s insistence on the diver-
sity of value. But what is at issue is not subjective diversity for its own 
sake but, as David Hesmondhalgh argues for his proposed moral econ-
omy approach to development, the fact that Sen’s theory is “pluralist” 
but not “relativist.”13
What Is in Sen’s Philosophical Tool-Box?
So, after this long preamble, what potentially is in the box of functionings 
that we might value in relation to media and communications?
I put it this way because Sen’s original formulations were rather different 
from the way we tend to talk about capabilities very often today, that is, as 
a set of human capacities that human beings should have or need, which is 
the way that Nussbaum has taken the capabilities approach. But, as Ingrid 
Robeyns pointed out, there is a major difference between Sen’s original 
formulation of the capabilities approach summarized in his “Quality of 
Life” essay and Nussbaum’s approach.14 Sen originally discussed capability 
as an abstract set of states of affairs: as “the capability of a person reflects 
 12. Moss, 96–99.
 13. Hesmondhalgh, 210.
 14. Robeyns.
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the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and 
from which he or she can choose one combination.”15
This is quite different from understanding capabilities as embodied 
abilities or capacities, which is Nussbaum’s approach.16 It is the flexibility 
of Sen’s approach that makes it more useful. This is a big debate in itself, 
which I can’t fully resolve here, but let me state baldly my sympathies with 
Sen’s resistance to coming up with a definitive list of capabilities. Siding 
with Sen here is not a matter of choosing vagueness or lack of resolution. 
Rather, Sen’s more flexible approach helps us think about an open and 
layered complexity, which is partly shaped by the variety of choices indi-
viduals make and which is premature to reduce in advance to a specific list 
of human capacities. This would however be of minimal relevance for the 
communications field if Nussbaum had already formulated some capabili-
ties, which we could clearly and specifically apply to our field, but she has 
not, even though Hesmondhalgh has offered some starting points for how 
we develop Nussbaum’s list of specific capabilities to media.
Toward Specifying Capabilities for the Media and Communications Field
So how, following Sen rather than Nussbaum, might we make progress in 
applying Sen’s more open and inductive approach to achieve some spec-
ificity about the capabilities relevant to the media and communications 
field? We can be relaxed about allowing in quite a bit of heterogeneity to 
this set of valuable functionings, for example, including not just achieved 
goods, but also open-ended freedoms.17 We can also include some things 
we might feel are close to “basic goods” (such as some basic access to an 
Internet connection) and others that may not be basic, but are strongly 
desirable. We can also, I have suggested, develop our account of capabili-
ties without too much concern with questions of what sorts of differences 
can be justified.
So, on my starting list for thinking about the set of functionings that we 
would all value in relation to media and communications (drawing in part 
on Nick Garnham’s pioneering formulations back in the late 1990s) would 
be: (i) not being harmed/humiliated, misrepresented through media, (ii) 
basic access to media resources, (iii) opportunity to be in some broad 
 15. Sen, “Equality of What?,” 31.
 16. Nussbaum.
 17. Sen, “Equality of What?,” 33.
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sense represented as a type, plus (iv) if one wants the chance to speak, the 
opportunity of voice.18 But these are just the start. For in the digital era 
our relation to other human beings and wider society through media has 
become much more complex than in the mass media era that Garnham 
have envisaged in his essays. As Robin Mansell noted back in 2002, our 
whole thinking about our entitlements in relation to media has to move 
beyond “the dominant ‘broadcast’ mode of media provision.”19 Which may 
mean that we need to orientate ourselves to different types of choice and 
different sites of choice in relation to communications from those that 
seemed set out for us in the era of limited channels and media flows that 
were relatively scarce rather than absolutely continuous and overlapping.
One possibility for supplementing Sen’s emphatically diverse set of 
functionings that is of particular relevance to media is Axel Honneth’s 
concept of recognition. The concept of recognition points to three levels 
in which human beings need to be recognized by each other if their lives 
are to have any integrity: the level of individual care and love, the level 
of moral agency, and most interestingly here, the level of recognition as a 
social actor. Or, as Honneth puts it in an essay called “Between Aristotle 
and Kant”: where “the individual is recognized as person whose capabili-
ties are of constitutive value to a concrete community.”20 I find it striking 
that in Stephen Coleman and Giles Moss’s interesting empirical explora-
tion of what citizens might think of as capabilities (or capacities) that they 
would want governments to recognize in them; some of those capabilities 
are quite close to recognition.21 I would propose that people do need to 
find themselves recognized, at least indirectly, in the representations of 
the world that are presented to them as their “reality.” It is a basic form 
of exclusion to be invisible, not so much individually, but as a type, or a 
nation, or a class, or an ethnicity, or a sexuality, in the narratives that pur-
port to describe one’s world and its actors.
As a philosopher, Honneth fits in well to my argument here because 
his approach is firmly Hegelian, not Kantian, in how he thinks about the 
relations between rationality, ethics, and social/institutional processes. For 
Honneth, “justice is the wellbeing of a society” (i.e., a super-personal large-
scale good),22 which is very different from saying, as Rawls does, that justice 
 18. Garnham.
 19. Mansell, 422.
 20. Honneth, Misrecognition, 139.
 21. Coleman and Moss.
 22. Honneth, “Recognition and Justice,” 354.
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is the virtue of just institutions whose justice is defined by their processual 
qualities. Honneth, like Sen, has his sights set on what is the good, not on 
the grounding of justice in an institutional process which, Rawlsian-style, 
is capable of generating just decisions about justice.
But there are some problems also with using Honneth to round out 
capabilities theory for media and communications: in particular, his 
attempt to subordinate the distinction between economic and symbolic 
both under the ambit of his master concept, recognition! So Honneth 
wrote in 2004 that both “economic disadvantage” and “cultural depriva-
tion” are aspects of the degrees “to which subjects can experience social dis-
respect or humiliation.”23 To equate extreme poverty with mere disrespect 
seems to ignore entirely the notion of basic goods that Sen holds onto 
and to override important hierarchies between goods that are important 
to any notion of justice. Similarly, it is less clear in Honneth than in Sen 
what role freedom to choose plays in the concept of recognition, though 
we might perhaps go back to Hegel and build freedom into the concept 
of recognition.
What comes out again here, in the contrast with Honneth, is the 
importance of Sen’s commitment to pluralism and complexity (of value) 
and his rejection, already clear from his earliest work on capabilities, of 
either overspecifying our conception of the good. (In this respect, perhaps 
Sen is closer to Nancy Fraser who insists on the values of both material 
resources and recognition.) But that needn’t stop us adding in the concept 
of recognition (in its multiple dimensions) as capturing a further set of 
functionings that need to be part of any person’s overall set of functionings 
from which they are free to choose. Some level of recognition in complex 
societies seems pretty close to a basic good, but exactly how, and at what 
level, is unresolved.
Introducing the concept of recognition into the capabilities approach 
to the discussion of media and communications enables the inclusion of 
other things that Sen doesn’t talk about, such as listening—the need to be 
listened to—at least at key moments when one wants or needs to speak. 
That move has major importance in current debates in communications: 
I am thinking, for example, of Tanja Dreher’s consistent work on listen-
ing in multicultural Australia and Hermann Wassermann’s article on “the 
ethics of listening” in a complex conflicted society such as South Africa.24 
 23. Honneth, “Recognition and Justice,” 352.
 24. Dreher; Wasserman.
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What I am suggesting here, and what I already hinted at earlier, is that 
the appropriate place to introduce the concept of recognition into our 
understanding of the good is not as a rival concept to capability or func-
tionings, but as a further element of the good, that is, as one aspect of the 
larger set of functionings that we value both generally and specifically in 
relation to media and communications, and from which we would want 
the opportunity to choose. This is more useful, I propose, than treating 
recognition purely as a process value that is required to ensure the justice 
of institutions.
There is a deeper reason too for adding in recognition to our picture 
of functionings and capabilities. This deeply relational good enables us 
to have a more credible sense of the many levels on which societal injus-
tice works. As Panjak Mishra noted in a 2013 New York Review of Books 
review of Sen’s recent work on India,25 part of the reason Sen has rejected 
traditional economic measures of societal success, such as growth rate and 
gross domestic product (GDP), is that they ignore other vital goods, such 
as those linked to education and the injuries to persons done by inequality 
itself. There is an echo here of debates on the fringes of political science, for 
example, Henry Milner’s excellent if neglected book Civil Literacy from the 
early 2000s on links between reducing economic inequality and increasing 
societal trust and, in turn, improving democratic functioning.26 We start 
to get a sense here of the huge interlocking complexity of the components 
of “the wellbeing of a society,” which then needs to inform our sense of the 
sorts of functioning that are important for evaluating the capabilities that 
people have.
Once again, it is the openness of Sen’s approach—his emphasis on 
capabilities as states of affairs that can be understood to operate on mul-
tiple levels and dimensions, rather than reduced exclusively to embodied 
capacities of individuals—it is this flexibility that helps us complicate our 
understanding of the multiple “goods” that matter in the media and com-
munications of complex societies.
This sense of increasing analytic complexity that emerges, as we start 
to think with Sen (but with other thinkers too) is very important and 
salutary today in our field. There are at least two reasons for this. First, 
because the acknowledgement of complexity is necessary, if our norma-
tive prescriptions are to be adequate to the actual “plurality of legitimate 
 25. Mishra.
 26. Milner.
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points of view” in complex societies, as Jean-Michel Bonvin puts it.27 One 
can also see a resonance here with the pluralist approach to value and 
critique by Luc Boltanski, particularly his work with Laurent Thévenot.28 
The second reason why Sen’s approach is salutary derives from the huge 
tensions between inherited normative frameworks and the accelerated 
development of new information infrastructures. Robin Mansell was the 
first to set out the overall problem, which flows from the growing tension 
between imposed system autonomy and still desired human autonomy 
on some scale, whether individual or collective.29 In 2017, she put things 
even more starkly when she insisted on the need for a new kind of dia-
logue about how these tensions will affect “what humans will do in their 
lives in the future.”30 A wave of new books is starting to open out this 
dialogue.31
Conclusion: The Advantage of Complexity
Let me try therefore, by way of conclusion, to explore a little further more 
why we need analytic complexity in the domain of the good, and particu-
larly the good in relation to the digital and the datafied.
Sen has always insisted on the layered complexity of values. So if, as 
he put it, “freedom cannot be fully appraised without some idea of what 
a person prefers and has reason to prefer” (and of course the good can’t 
be grasped without including within it some notion of freedom), then 
it is the interrelations between values that are crucial, what Sen calls in 
the same chapter a person’s “entire system of values, including values 
about values.”32 This emphasis on second- and higher-order values, values 
about values: Isn’t this particularly important at a time not just of tension 
between values, but a time when a higher level of normative complex-
ity is being written out by the rapid advance of automated evaluations, 
delegated algorithmic systems for categorizing and valuing human beings 
against each other for multiple purposes? An era of automated inequality 
is a time that requires us above all to hold onto choices about choices, 
 27. Bonvin.
 28. Boltanski and Thévenot.
 29. Mansell, Imagining the Internet.
 30. Mansell, “Inequality and Digitally Mediated,” 158.
 31. For example, Frischmann and Selinger; Lanier. See also Couldry and Mejias (forthcoming 
2019).
 32. Sen, Rationality and Freedom, 5–6.
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values about values.33 In such a time, we need to know why some of our 
values, the values that certain institutional forces are happy to delegate to 
automation, have value.
Datafication (the requirement, not just the possibility, that every  variation 
in the texture of human experience be translated into data for counting 
and processing) is inclining the social terrain—indeed is  reconfiguring the 
social terrain—into a space formed in large part by  automated choice, or 
what legal scholar Karen Yeung calls “hypernudge.”34 As such, this attempt 
to automate many domains of choice need not reduce the complexity of 
our ethical lives as human beings, for we can try to stand to the side of 
this. But we have no choice but to acknowledge the force with which 
this reengineering of practical and ethical choice is becoming woven into 
the organization of social and economic transactions,  converting much of 
what have not been transactions into the transactional, into the  capturable. 
A transformation that cannot be understood at all without grasping 
the new political economy of datafication, and specifically the political 
 economy of the platforms across which so much of what counts as social 
life is being performed. If, to put it bluntly, platforms are machines for 
producing “social life” for capitalism (under the governance of capitalism), 
then we need a clear sense of the embedded values and notions of the good 
that are likely to be overlain by this new production.
Some are unconcerned by all this: hoping perhaps, like Kevin Kelly, 
for a species-level transformation toward a new collective intelligence; or 
arguing, like Jeremy Rifkin, that while there are risks in this transforma-
tion, the normative ground has already been ceded and values, such as pri-
vacy, formed in an older political economy and social order, have been lost 
irretrievably.35 But, as popular historian and futurist, Yuval Harari, points 
out, the choices about choices involved here cannot be so easily swept 
away. Indeed, Harari goes further and argues that “a critical examination 
of Dataist dogma is likely to be not only the greatest scientific challenge 
of the 21st century, but also the most urgent political and economic proj-
ect.”36 If so, then we have never needed more a sharp focus on what counts 
as good, on what complex, layered states of affairs cannot be regarded as 
good: states of affairs that threaten the fragile and deeply interconnected 
 33. Eubanks.
 34. Yeung, 118–36.
 35. Kelly; Rifkin.
 36. Harari, 459.
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mass of possibilities that we would want to include among the conditions 
of a good life. This is a time indeed to reject what no less a figure than 
Pope Francis in his 2015 Encyclical called the “reductionism” of “the tech-
nocratic paradigm.”37
As Amartya Sen noted 20 years ago, “the achievement of social justice 
depends not only on institutional forms (including democratic rules and 
regulations), but also on effective practices.”38 Surely one such effective 
practice is how we think about and parse “the good” in all its complex-
ities. As our grid of norms becomes ever more stretched and challenged 
by our fast-changing infrastructure for processing data and information, 
we need robust support, not so much toward the impossibly large goal of 
 creating a just society, but more basically to hold onto an adequately com-
plex account of the good, and its relation to the freedom to choose in a 
complex world. That is why our field needs more than ever, the capabilities 
theory of Amartya Sen.
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